Ekumenopolis ve Otesi: Imre Azem ile bir STATUS/الوضع Soylesisi

Ekumenopolis ve Otesi: Imre Azem ile bir STATUS/الوضع Soylesisi

Ekumenopolis ve Otesi: Imre Azem ile bir STATUS/الوضع Soylesisi

By : Status/الوضع Audio-Visual Podcast Hosts

Ekümenopolis ve Ötesi: İmre Azem ile bir STATUS/الوضع Söyleşisi

Bu röportajda kent antropoloğu Duygu Parmaksızoğlu, Ekümenopolis filminin yönetmeni İmre Azem ile kentsel dönüşüm ve son filmi Yeniden İnşa Çağı konusunda söyleşiyor. Azem bu filminde küresel sermayenin kentleri nasıl şekillendirdiğini ele alıyor.

Aşağıdaki röportaj ayrı ayrı dinlenebilir dört parçadan oluşuyor. Ses kaydının dökümü ve İngilizce diline çevirisi aşağıdadır.

İmre Azem 1975 yılında İstanbul`da doğdu. 1998`de New Orleans`daki Tulane Üniversitesi`nin Siyaset Bilimi ve Fransız Edebiyatı bölümlerinden mezun oldu. Ayrıca Paris`teki Sorbonne Üniversitesi`nde Fransız Edebiyatı derecesini tamamlamak üzere çalışmalar yaptı. 1998 yılnda mezun olduktan sonra New York`a taşındı ve medya üzerine çalışmaya başladı. 2004`ten itibaren bağımsız projelerde fotoğraf yönetmeni ve editör olarak çalıştı. Aynı zamanda mobilya tasarımı ve yapımında çalıştı.

2007 yılında İstanbul`da neoliberal kentleşmeyi konu alan Ekümenopolis: Ucu Olmayan Şehir belgeselini yönetmek üzere İstanbul`a taşındı. 2011 yılında tamamlanan uzun metrajlı belgesel ödüle layık görüldü. İmre Azem aynı zamanda kent meselelerine dair raporlama ve eylem çalışmaları yapan gönüllü bir grup olan İstanbul Kent Hareketleri`nin bir üyesidir.

Son filmi Agorafobi Ekim 2013`te tamamlandı. İmre Azem halen mobilya yapmaya ve çoğu kentsel meselelere odaklanan aktivist filmler çekmeye devam ediyor. Azem, diken.com.tr için video haberciliği de yapıyor.

Please scroll down for English translation of transcript below.

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Interview Transcript

Transcribed by Cihan Tekay

Duygu Parmaksızoğlu (DP): İmre biraz kısaca kendinden bahseder misin? Film çekme işine kadar neler yaptın?

İmre Azem (İA): 1998 senesinde New Orleans’da bulunan Tulane Üniversitesi`nden mezun oldum. Mezun olduktan sonra New York’a geldim. Bir süre dergicilik yaptım. 2002-2003 senelerinde film yapmaya başladım. O zaman da tam film yapmıyordum aslında, başkalarının projelerinde kameramanlık yapıyordum. Kurgu öğrendim, kamera öğrendim falan, öyle işler yaptım. Sonra bir süre marangozluk yaptım. Sonra yeteri kadar deneyim ve biraz da marangozluktan da para kazanınca kendi projemi yapmanın zamanı geldi diye düşündüm ve Ekümenopolis’i yapmak için İstanbul’a döndüm 2007’de. 

DP: Ekümenopolis belgeselini çekmeye giden süreçten biraz bahseder misin? Ne zaman bu projeyi düşünmeye başladın? Ya da bu projeyi başlatan belirli olaylar var mı? Neden İstanbul’un dönüşümü? İlk proje için niye böyle bir şey düşündün? 

İA: Kent üzerine bir film yapma fikri hep vardı zaten. İstanbul’a gidip geldikçe, “Bu kent neden planlanamıyor?” diye soruyordum ilk başlarda. İlk sorgulamalarım hep böyle, planlama üzerindendi. İstanbul’a döndükten sonra, biraz daha işin içine girince, araştırınca falan, 3. Köprü mesela çok öne çıkan bir temaydı, kentsel dönüşüm aynı şekilde falan. Ama bunların hiçbirini böyle derinlemesine inceleyen bir belgesel yapmak yerine, bunlar arasındaki bağlantıları gösteren bir şey yapmayı istedim, daha böyle büyük resmi gösteren. Çünkü benim de aslında merak ettiğim oydu. Yani bu şeyler nasıl birbiriyle ilişkili? İşte kentsel dönüşüm, 3. Köprü, ulaşım, konut meselesi falan, tabii işin içine girince o bağlantılar çok daha net ortaya çıktı ve Ekümenopolis aslında benim de bildiğim, eğitimini aldığım bir konu değildi. Yani ben bunları görüyorum, biliyorum, şimdi de anlatayım gibi bir süreç olmadı. Benim de öğrenme sürecim oldu, ve öğrendiklerimi de yalın bir şekilde aktarma projesi diyelim. 

DP: Peki neden “Ekümenopolis” ismi? 

iA: Yaptığım araştırmalar sırasında okuduğum bir makalede karşılaştım Ekümenopolis’le. Ahmet Vefik Alp ilk kullanmıştı İstanbul için.

DP: Kendisi şehir plancısıydı sanırım?

İA: Evet mimar, şehir plancısı. İlk o kullanmıştı İstanbul için Ekümenopolis’i. Araştırdım ben de biraz, Ekümenopolis’in ne olduğunu ve tam da uyduğunu. Film bitmeden çok çok önce araştırma safhasında koymuş oldum ismini.  

DP: Çok da güzel oturmuş. Türkiye’de kentsel dönüşüm söz konusu olduğunda oluşmuş hakim bir algı var, insanların belli bir düşünme şekli var bununla ilgili. Bu algının bir yanında depremden korunma, kentleri güzelleştirme, sağlamlaştırma yer alıyor, diğer yanını da ekonomik büyüme vesaire oluşturuyor. Ekümenopolis tam da bu algıyı dağıtan, sorgulayan bir yere düşüyor. Sence bu film hakim algıyı etkileme açısından ne kadar etkili oldu? Kimlere ulaşabildi? Filmi hazırlarken aklında bir izleyici kitlesi var mıydı? Bu kitlelere ulaşabildin mi? Filmle vermek istediğin mesajlar, anlatmak istediğin dertler ne kadar yerine ulaştı?

İA: Biz filmi yaparken hedef kitlemiz öncelikle üniversite öğrencileriydi. Ama geldiği noktada bizim hayal ettiğimizden çok daha geniş bir kitleye ulaştığını söyleyebilirim. Bu kadar beklemiyorduk biz. Ben bunun bir şekilde kulaktan kulağa yayılacağını tahmin edebiliyordum, çünkü tartışma başlatan bir film. Ya da aslında herkesin çok içinde olduğu ya da herkesin söyleyecek çok şeyi olduğu konuda bir tartışma zemini oluşturabilecek bir film, içindeki verilerle falan. Onlar üzerinden yapılabilecek tartışmalar var. O anlamda önemli bir katkısı olduğunu görüyorum. Mesela yaptığımız söyleşilerde, gösterimlerden sonra yaptığımız söyleşilerde aslında dediğim gibi insanların bu konuda çok dolu olduğunu, bıraksan böyle sabaha kadar herkes konuşabilir yani. Film o tartışma zeminine bir çerçeve, bir altlık görevi görüyor. O anlamda ben çok değerli buluyorum aslında. Yeteri kadar insana ulaştı mı? Yani bir şeyler değiştirecek bir seviyeye geldi mi? Onu bilemiyorum. Bunu nasıl ölçeceğimi de bilmiyorum. Sonuçta bu bir kıvılcım yani bu. O kıvılcımı ateşe dönüştürecek bir sürü etken olabilir, bunlar ufak ateşler yakabilir her yerde bilmiyorum. Ama bizim aldığımız geri dönüşler çok olumlu. Yani herkesin hayatına bir şey kattığını hissettiği bir film oldu. Bunun dışında totalde ne kadar etkisi olduğu... Sonuçta biz bir şeyleri değiştirmek için bir film yaptık, değiştirebildik mi çok emin değilim yani, belki başka şeylerle beraber, hani mücadelenin diğer bileşenleriyle beraber bir etkimiz olmuştur. 

DP: Bahsettiğin o çerçeve ve zemin mevzusu hakikaten de birebir oturuyor. Filmden sonra bu konuları konuşmak, anlamak, anlatmak daha kolay oldu. Sanırım hepimizin o geniş bakış açısına ihtiyacı vardı. Yani yaşadığımız süreci anlayabilmek, bir yere yerleştirebilmek açısından. Kendi gözlemlerimden yola çıkarak diyebilirim ki belgeseli izleyen herkesin kentsel dönüşüm meselesine yaklaşımında bir değişiklik oldu. Pek çok insanın bu sürecin geldiği noktadan artık ürkmeye başladığını görüyoruz. 

İA: Guardian’da mesela bir makale çıktı “Roots of Gezi” diye. Ekümenopolis’in nasıl Gezi’den önce kent meselesine insanları uyandırdığı falan, aslında Gezi’nin dinamitlerinin oralarda aranması gerektiği falan bizi mutlu eden şeyler. 

DP: Kentsel dönüşüm sürecini kenti bir bütün olarak algılamanın önündeki belki de en güçlü engel. Süreç kenti birbirinden koparıp parçalara ayırıyor ve her parçayı potansiyel bir rant aracı, bir meta haline getiriyor. Uğradığı her sokakta, binada, mahallede yaşam alanları değil “yatırımlar” yaratıyor. İstanbul’da belki de şu an herkes, Ayşe Çavdar’ın deyimiyle “yatırımın içinde yaşıyor”. Yaşadığımız kente ve ekolojiye dair genel tahayyül geliştirilemiyor. İçinde yaşadığımız kaostan çıkmanın belki de tek yolu bu genel tahayyülü oluşturmak. Kente ya da ekolojiye dair o genel bakış açısını, vizyonu oluşturmak. Sence bu genel tahayyül nasıl oluşturulabilir? 

İA: Bence en genel kapsamıyla demokratikleşmeyle aslında olabilecek bir şey. Nasıl? Kent üzerinde bizim, yani yaşayanların daha çok söz sahibi olduğu bir mekanizma kurulabilirse tabii söz sahibi olduğun bir şey üzerinde daha çok sahiplenme ve kentli olma bilincinin ortaya çıkması biraz onunla alakalı bir şey. Yani tabii ki Gaziosmanpaşa’da oturan birinin atıyorum Sarıyer’de yapılaşmakta olan bir parkı koruması falan, bunlar çok güzel şeyler. Tek tük örneklerini de gördüğümüz şeyler. Ama herkesten bekleyebileceğimiz şeyler değil açıkçası. Ama en azından kendi yaşam alanları üzerinde söz sahibi olabilirse insanlar bu kentlilik bilincinin yavaş yavaş gelişeceğini düşünüyorum. Bir anda olacak bir şey değil.  Bizim yapacağımız bir şeyle de olacak bir şey değil. Ama o demokratik mekanizmaların, kent üzerindeki kenti şekillendiren mekanizmaların demokratikleşmesiyle ilgili bir süreç diye düşünüyorum. Yoksa insanlara film göstererek ya da kitap okutarak o bilinci vermek çok mümkün değil. Yaşayarak, o sürece dahil olarak bence daha sağlıklı bir şekilde onu hissedebilirler. Bir de şunu da söylemek lazım. 15-20 milyon insanın bir arada yaşaması çok doğal bir şey değil zaten. Yani kentin bu kadar büyük olması insan doğasına da aykırı. Onun için o şeyin içinde, doğal olmayan o ortamın içinde yine de bir nebze insanın kentli gibi hissetmesi, oraya ait hissetmesi bence dediğim gibi demokratik süreçlerle alakalı bir şey. 

DP: Evet, çok doğru. Doğal bir şey değil 15-20 milyon insanın bir arada yaşamaya çalışması. 

İA: Kentin bu kadar büyümüş olması zaten doğal değil. Onun için herkesin o kente sahip çıkmasını beklemek de zaten absürd yani. 

DP:  “Kent hakkı” kavramı, yani barınma, eğitim, sağlıklı çevre sağlık hizmetlerine eşit ulaşım hakkı, o kent içinde yaşayan herkes tarafından benimsenmediği takdirde soyut bir kavram olarak kalıyor. Ancak ona herkes aynı şekilde sahip çıktığı anda bir manası oluyor. Herkesten aynı şekilde yaşam alanlarına sahip çıkmasını beklemek, aynı mücadelelere katılmasını beklemek zor. 

İA: Bir de herkesten kastımız da çok önemli. Herkes gerçekten herkes mi? Çünkü David Harvey’nin İstanbul’dayken yaptığımız röportajında söylediği bir şey var, Express’te yayınlanmıştı galiba röportaj. “Kent hakkı” aslında kapsayıcı bir kavram, ama kapsayıcılığı bazı şeyleri dışarıda bırakması ile mümkün oluyor. Bir kesimi de dışarda bırakması gerekiyor kent hakkı kavramının. O da işte sermaye aslında. Sonuçta herkes derken tam herkes de değil. Diğer geri kalanlar kent üzerinde söz sahibi olacaklarsa, kendi ihtiyaçları ve arzuları doğrultusunda şekillendirecekleri bir kentten, kent hakkından bahsedeceksek, o zaman mecburen bahsettiğimiz bu sermayenin kent hakkı kavramının dışında bırakılması gerekiyor. 

DP: Peki sence şu anki kent hareketleri, mesela Kent Hareketleri, İstanbul Kent Savunması, Kuzey Ormanları Savunması, Müştereklerimiz, mahalle dernekleri, dayanışmaları, bunları bir arada düşündüğümüzde kentle ilgili  bahsettiğimiz genel tahayyüllün oluşturulmasında ne kadar etkili? Sence bu hareketler, oluşumlar ne kadar etkili İstanbul’un geleceğini şekillendirmede?

İA: Bu hareketler, bir kısmı senelerdir mücadele ediyorlar. Özellikle meslek odaları, kent mücadelesini kendi başlarına onlarca senedir aslında yürütüyorlar. Ama kitleselleşememiş bir şekilde bunu yürütüyorlar. Gezi’den önce yine tek tük mahalle dernekleri, bu kentsel dönüşüm tehdidi altındaki mahallelerin yavaş yavaş uyanmaları, bir araya gelmeleriyle bir hareketlenme olmuştu ama bu Gezi’den sonra bence gerçekten yaşam alanlarına sahip çıkma adına bir sıçrama oldu yani. 

DP: Yaşama alanına sahip çıkma meselesi bir anlatı, bir somutluk mu kazandı? 

İA: Hem somutluk kazandı, hem somutluk kazanması da onu besleyen, yani insanların hayatına dokunduğu için herkesin o mevzuya angaje olduğu bir şey yarattı Gezi. Bu saydıklarının çoğu, Kuzey Ormanları Savunması olsun, Haliç Dayanışması olsun bunlar hep Gezi’den sonra aslında hep güçlenen ortaya çıkan, park meclisleri, mahalle meclisleri, forumları, onlardan çıkan bir hareket. Ne kadar etkisi var? Bence fiili olarak çok büyük kazanımlar elde ettiğini söylemek mümkün değil ama bu etkisiz anlamına gelmiyor bence. Eğer Validebağ’da polis ablukası altında ancak inşaat devam edebiliyorsa bu bence önemli bir kazanımdır. Başakşehir’deki Göçmen Konutlarında yine polis ablukası altında İmam Hatip inşaatı yapılıyorsa bu önemli bir kazanımdır. Mesela Emek Sineması mücadelesi de buna iyi bir örnek. O da Gezi’den çok önce başlayan bir mücadele ve şu anda geldiğimiz noktada kaybedilmiş ya da kaybedilmeye yakın bir mücadele aslında. Ama Emek Sineması mücadelesinin genel kent hakkı mücadelesindeki yeri ona çok büyük bir ivme kazandırmıştır. Onun için de bu açıdan baktığım zaman ben somut bir kazanımı olmasa da bu mücadelelerin bir sonraki evreyi güçlendirdiğini düşünüyorum, kar topu efekti gibi. Ama yolun da çok başında olduğumuzu söylemek lazım. Bu mücadeleler somut kazanımlara dönüşecek ilerde ama bunu inatla sürdürmek gerektiğini düşünüyorum. 

DP: Bir gecede büyük değişimler beklememek gerekiyor.  Hakim algıların gün geçtikçe aşındığını, kentsel dönüşüme dair algı yönetimini eskisi kadar kolay yapamadıklarını zaten fark ediyoruz. Belli kazanımlar var ama olmamız gereken yerde değiliz. 

 İA: Ben yerinde sayacağını düşünmüyorum. Biz örgütlenmeyi daha iyi yaptıkça, kenti daha iyi anladıkça, bu değişik örgütlenmeler, mahalle örgütlenmeleri, meslek örgütlenmeleri, bunlar gitgide daha yakın çalışmaya başladıkça, mahallelerin kendi aralarındaki örgütlenmen arttıkça artı Türkiye’de daha henüz konuşulmaya bile başlanmayan ama bu mücadelenin kazanılması için kritik önemde olan bir şey var. O da emek mücadelesiyle, işçi mücadelesiyle mahalledeki bu kent mücadelesinin birbiriyle bir ilişki kurması ve o aradaki boşluğu, açıklığı kapatması gerekiyor. David Harvey’nin söylediği şeylerden bir tanesi de bu. Şimdi biz bu mahallerdeki yapıyı emekçiler, emekçi mahalleleri diye görüyorsak, özellikle tehdit altında olan mahalleleri, bu insanların hayatlarındaki iki öneli yer: hem iş yerleri, hem evleri. İki tarafta da bir örgütlenme olup, bunların birleşmesi ancak bizi bir sonraki evreye taşıyabilecek kent hakkı mücadelesinde. Bunun henüz Türkiye’de bir örneği gözükmüyor. 

 DP: Münferit sayılabilecek örnekler var belki.  

İA: Gezi’de Taksim Dayanışması’nın içinde yer alarak sendikalar işte DİSK, KESK, TTP falan, bunlar kentsel mücadele saflarında ilk defa yer aldılar. Ondan önce diğer şeylerde yoklardı, diğer mücadelelerin parçası değillerdi. Dediğim gibi Gezi’nin ya da Taksim Dayanışması’nın kazanımlarından bir tanesi de bu emek örgütlerinin kent mücadelesine bir ucundan girmiş olmaları, bunun devam etmesi çok önemli. 

DP: Bunları birlikte düşünmek fikrinin başlangıcı belki de.

İA: Yani şimdi biz kent hakkı mücadelesi içinde sadece kentle ilgili bir olguya karşı mücadele etmiyoruz. Neoliberal sisteme karşı mücadele ediyoruz. Ve bu neoliberal sistem sadece kente zarar vermiyor, ya da sadece kent değil etkilediği alan. Bütün emek alanını etkiliyor, kültürü etkiliyor, hayatın her alanını etkiliyor. Yediğimiz içtiğimiz, işte enerji falan. Onun için kent hakkı mücadelesini o çerçevenin içine oturtmak da önemli. Kırsalda verilen HES mücadelesi, işte nükleer santrallere karşı verilen mücadele, genel olarak Türkiye’de demokratikleşme mücadelesi, vesaire. Bütün bunların aslında birbiriyle çok yakından ilişkili olduğunu görmek lazım. Onun için diğer mücadelelerle olan ilişkisini de kurmak lazım.  

DP: İstersen şimdi biraz da yeni filmden bahsedelim. Yeni belgesel üzerine çalışıyorsun. Hatta çekimler için yakın zamanda Fransa’daydın, oradaki emlak fuarına gittin. Neden bu fuara gittin, gözlemlerin neler? Bunlardan biraz bahseder misin?

İA: Ekümenopolis’te biz genel olarak sermayenin kentte ne yaptığını anlatıyoruz. Hep böyle bir sermaye lafı geçiyor, yabancı sermaye diyoruz, yerli sermaye diyoruz. Genel olarak kent mücadelesinde de hep böyle konuşuyoruz.  Ama bu sermaye kimdir, nedir, nerden gelir, nereye gider, biraz buna bakmak istiyoruz. O sermaye dediğimiz olgunun altını doldurmak istiyoruz. Bazı somut tanımlamalar yapabilmek istiyoruz. Ve bu sermayenin birincisi genel olarak dünyadaki finans piyasalarındaki işleyişini, ikincisi de inşaat ve emlak sektörüyle olan bağlantısını kurmak istiyoruz. Yine Ekümenopolis`te olduğu gibi bizim bildiğimiz ve artık biz biliyoruz hadi bunu anlatalım dediğimiz bir şey değil. Yine bizim öncelikle kendimizin öğrenmesi ve anlaması gereken bir şey. Kendi kendimizi eğitmeye çalışıyoruz, bu konuda bilgi almaya çalışıyoruz falan. Yatırım yapıp karşılığında bir kar elde etmek isteyen o yatırımcıyla, Gaziosmanpaşa’da evi yıkılan Şadi Amca arasındaki o zinciri, mekanizmayı göstermek istiyoruz. Nasıl başlıyor, hangi araçlarla nereden oraya kadar geliyor? Ekümenopolis’te ne olduğunu, etkisini bence yeterince anlattık. Şimdi resmin öteki tarafına bakıp biraz da işin köküne inen bir film yapmak istiyoruz. Ama tabii bunu bilmediğimiz için daha fazla bir şey söyleyemeyeceğim. Bu sadece bizim perspektifimiz ve amacımız diyelim. Bunu göstermeyi amaçlıyoruz, inşallah gösterebiliriz. 

DP: Heyecanla bekliyoruz. Lamekan ikinci filmin fragmanıydı sanırım. O da bayağı paylaşıldı sosyal medya sayfalarında, çok karşıma çıktı, çok da güzel tepkiler aldı.

İA: Evet, ufak bir fragman, paylaşılıyor. Ben bakıyorum arada, günde 200-300 izleyicisi var. 

DP: Evet, bu ilgi artarak devam edecektir. Ben yine bu fuara dönmek istiyorum. Senin Diken’de  çıkan yazını okudum. Türkiye’de şu an inşaat sektörünün geldiği noktayı ve ne yöne doğru evirilmekte olduğunu merakla takip ediyorum. Biliyorsun ben de Fikirtepe’deki kentsel dönüşüm üzerine çalışıyorum. O projede de kırka yakın firma var, firmaların bir çoğunun durumları, gelecekleri belirsiz. Yani bu işin sonu nereye gidecek, bu insanlar nereden para bulacaklar da devam edecekler, ne olacak ben de merakla takip ediyorum. Kısaca fuardaki gözlemlerinden bahseder misin?

İA: Fuar’da şimdi genel resim, Türkiye çok para harcamış. Türkiye’deki yatırımcılar, belediyeler, yani hem kamu hem özel sektör olarak fuara çok büyük bir çıkartma yapmışlar.  Ama Türkiye MIPIM’de son 4-5 senedir boy gösteriyor. Daha önce MIPIM’de yok, ki MIPIM 1990 senesinden beri yapılan, dünyanın en büyük emlak fuarı. Burada üç tane önemli Türk aktörden bahsedebiliriz bu tanıtım yükünün altına giren. Bir tanesi İstanbul Ticaret Odası, bir tanesi belediyeler (Beyoğlu, Ankara, vb.), stant açan Balıkesir belediyesi, Bursa, Antalya belediyeleri, ilk defa gelmişler. Bir de kendine kısaca BIG diyen Beyoğlu Investment Group adı altında birleşen 32 tane Beyoğlu’nda yatırımı olan şirket. Bu yatırımcılar işte bu şemsiye grup altında bir araya gelmişler ve Beyoğlu belediyesinin öncülüğünde bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyorlar ve MIPIM’de bayağı büyük paralar harcayarak Türkiye’nin tanıtımı, sonra İstanbul’un tanıtımı, sonra Beyoğlu’nun tanıtımı gibi böyle halkalı bir şeyin içindeler. Öncelikle mesela çok büyük bir İstanbul çadırı kiralamışlar. 4 tane büyük çadır alanı vardı MPIM’de. Bir tanesi Hollanda ülke olarak kendi kentleri için almış, bir tane Londra’nın çadırı, bir tane Paris’in çadırı bir tane de İstanbul’un çadırı vardı. 3.6 milyon Euro harcanmış sadece çadır için. İçinde 96 metre karelik bir İstanbul maketi, bütün MIPIM’dekilerin İstanbul’u konuşmasını sağlayacak yani öyle büyük bir maket. İstanbul Ticaret Odası Çin’de yaptırtıyor maketi. Muazzam bir para harcanmış, açılış partisine sponsor olunmuş, muazzam bir açılış partisine. Her tarafta böyle BIG, İTO falan yazıyor. Ve değişik işte dört gün boyunca konferanslar, konuşmacılar İstanbul’la ilgili. Discover Turkey konuşmaları, paneller falan böyle. Yatırımcılara özel kahvaltılar organize edilmiş. Beyoğlu belediyesi organize etmişti bir tanesini. Bayağı bir PR yapılıyor. Bütün konuşmalarda, sunumlarda, çadırın içinde, Türk köşesinde falan her yerde çok toz pembe bir Türkiye fotoğrafı çizilmeye çalışılıyor. İki ana nokta üzerinden Türkiye pazarlanıyor: İstanbul ve Beyoğlu. Bunlardan bir tanesi artık Türkiye’nin artık bir tüketim toplumu olması, bunun altı özellikle altı her seferinde özellikle çiziliyor. Bunu destekleyen mesela Türkiye’de senede 110 bin tane evlilik olduğu, mesela İstanbul Ticaret Odası başkanı bunu söylüyor. Bu kadar evlilik demek bu kadar konut talebi demek, ama tabii konutla da kalmıyor. Çamaşır makinası, buzdolabı, televizyon, vb., bunlar tüketimi pompalayan şeyler ve buradan da mesela evliliği bu kadar önemseyen bir muhafazakarlığın aslında ekonomik bağlantısını, çıkarını görebiliyorsun falan. Muhafazakarlık ve sermaye arasındaki eklem yerlerinden bir tanesi bu.  

DP: Ya da sermayenin kendi tasarladığı “aile” kavramı ve dayattığı ahlak anlayışı. 

İA: Evet. Bu birincisi. Yani Türkiye’nin bir tüketim toplumu olması, Türkiye’yi satarken, pazarlarken kullanılan şeylerden birincisi. İkincisi Türkiye’nin gelişmekte olan ekonomisi, büyüme rakamlarıyla veriliyor, çok toz pembe gösteriliyor. İşte 2008’deki krizi biz yaşamadık, atlattık, çok güçlü bir ekonomimiz var gibi toz pembe rakamlarla bir ekonomi fotoğrafı çiziliyor. Üçüncüsü de tabii hiç eskimeyen ve İstanbul’un aslında en kolay, en satılabilir şeyi 8 bin 500 yıllık tarihi. Asya’yla Avrupa’nın ortasında klişeleri. Yani düşündüğün zaman zaten 8 bin 500 senedir var olan bir kentten 15 senede ne kadar bunun ağzına da sıçsan, ne kadar kötü de yönetsen, sonuçta 8 bin 500 seneyi 15 senede mahvedemezsin yani. O tarihi birikimi bitirmeye çok uğraştılar ama sonuçta hala onu kullanıyorlar, bir meta olarak satabiliyorlar. Aslında bu projelerle yok ettikleri şeyleri projenin pazarlamasında da kullanabiliyor hiç yüzü kızarmadan. Üçüncüsü de bu. Bu üç şey üzerinden pazarlanıyor aslında Türkiye. Onun dışındaki kentlere baktığın zaman fuarın geri kalanında, yani Londra, Paris, Kiev, Sao Paolo kendini nasıl pazarlıyor diye baktığın zaman şunu görüyorsun: konusu İstanbul olmayan konferanslarda da mesela altı çizilen yeni trend bölgesel koalisyon kentleri. 

 DP: Ne demek o?

İA: Yani tek bir kent değil aslında bir kentler topluluğunu pazarlıyor. Birkaç kentin birbiriyle koordinasyonu üzerinden mesela. 

DP: Bir örnek verebilir misin? 

İA: Hollanda, Almanya bu örnekleri verdi. Tam kent isimlerini şimdi hatırlamıyorum. Birbiriyle bağlantılı, kendi içinde görev dağılımı olan kentler grubu

DP: Hinterlandından kopmuş tek bir kent değil de kentler grubu, bölge.

İA: Hollanda’nın bir ülke olarak çadır kiralaması bunun bir göstergesi mesela. Amsterdam’ı pazarlamıyor, bir kentler bütününü pazarlıyor. Yeni trend bu deniyor. 

DP: İstanbul o zaman biraz geride mi kaldı?

İA: İstanbul tipi tek bir odak olan kentlerin zamanı geçti deniyor. Küresel kent değil, küresel bölge. Tabii bunlar hep yatırım perspektifinden bakılarak söylenen şeyler. Yatırım için böyle bir şey önemli. İkincisi üretim üzerinden bir değer yaratma çabası var. Yani İstanbul’la karşılaştırmak ne kadar doğru bilmiyorum ama Avrupa’nın daha ufak kentleri kendilerini tarihleriyle, kültürleriyle değil, mesela orada bir üretim olmasıyla öne çıkarmaya çalışıyorlar. Bir endüstrinin olması, fabrikaların olması, bir işçi sınıfının olması. Hatta sadece sanayii üretiminin değil tarımsal üretimin de pazarlandığı, kente güç katan bir şeyler anlamında. 

DP: Daha farklı bir sosyal dokunun, dengeli sınıfsal ilişkilerin olduğu bir kent tasavvuru mu? 

İA: Bu her ne kadar kentin pazarlanması stratejisi olsa da, sonuçta, ekonomist değilim bunu çok net söyleyemiyorum ama, sanki daha sürdürülebilir bir kentleşmenin öğeleri gibi pazarlanıyor. Yani İstanbul ve diğer kentlerin pazarlanmasının arasında gözlemlediğimiz farkı anlatmaya çalışıyorum. Bunun dışında az önce bahsettiğim gibi İstanbul bu kadar para harcıyor bu pazarlamaya, ama Financial Times gazetesi, kapitalizmin bayraktarı, yayın organı, fuarın açıldığı gün, 10 Mart günü, yarım sayfalık bir analiz yazısı yayınlıyor. Bu yazıda özellikle Tayyip Erdoğan’ın kibrinin yargıyı kontrolü altına alma çabası, basını kontrolü altına alma çabası, baskılaması, para politikasını, işte Merkez Bankası ile olan polemikler üzerinden, ekonomi politikasını baskı altına almaya çalışmasını, genel olarak toplumun hayat tarzına müdahaleleri dayatmaları, bunun üzerinden kibirli bir Erdoğan portresi çizip bunun nasıl yabancı yatırımcıyı kaçırdığından bahsediyor bu yazı. Fuarda bedava dağıtılan bu gazete fuarın açılış günü yarım sayfa bu yazıyı yayınlıyor. Herkes bu gazeteyi okuyor, Türkler hariç büyük ihtimalle. Ve herkes aslında bütün bu politik ortamın, risklerin, her şeyin iyiye gitmediğinin farkında. Yani kimse toz pembe Türkiye resmi çizen konferansı dinleyip gidip 200 milyon dolarını Türkiye’ye yatırmıyor. Özellikle o elit yatırımcı kesim, Avrupalı, Türkiye’de olan bitenleri yakından biliyor ve bu politik riskler onlar için yatırımın getirisinden çok daha önemli. Yani ekonomik riskleri hesap edebiliyor ama politik riski hesap edemiyor. Hesap edemediği için de girmek istemiyor. Biz yatırımcılarla da konuştuk Cannes’da. Yani Türkiye’de otel yatırımı yapan, yüz milyonlarca dolar yatırımı olan insanlarla da konuştuk. Tabii kameraya karşı hiçbir şey söylemiyorlar. Herşeyin çok iyi olduğunu yatırım yapmaya devam edeceklerini söylüyorlar. Ama kamera kapalıyken konuşulan mevzular aslında herkesin, potansiyel yatırımcıların ötesinde, hali hazırda yatırımı olanların Türkiye’den çıkmaya çalıştığı konuşuluyor. Bizim aldığımız izlenim bu. Yani o bütün o harcanan paralar aslında haybeye harcanıyor.   

DP: Son bir soru daha sorayım. Biraz gelecekten bahsedelim istiyorum, İstanbul’un geleceğinden. TOKİ, AVM, lüks gökdelenler falan, bunların hakimiyetinde bir şehir oluşuyor. Sokaklar gitgide değişiyor. İnsanlar arasındaki etkileşimler tek tipleşiyor ve azalıyor. Şehri şehir yapan unsurlardan biri insanlar arasındaki etkileşimlerin çeşitliliği ve sıklığı. Şu an bu etkileşimler bir yandan azalırken, bir yandan da homojenleşmiş bir hal alıyor. Bu şekilde devam ettiği takdirde bundan bir beş on sene sonra nasıl bir İstanbul hayal ediyorsun? Kafanda İstanbul’la ilgili bir resim var mı bundan 5-10 sene sonrası için? 

İA: Bu böyle devam ederse diyelim, bu İstanbul vizyonu, tahayyülü aslında bir değişim, sürekli değişim tahayyülü. Yani bunun beş sene sonra ulaşacağı ve duracağı bir nokta yok. Nasıl şu anda bir şantiye alanıysa büyük bir değişim yaşıyorsa beş sene sonra bu inşaatlar bitecek ve yepyeni bir İstanbul olacak diye bir şey yok. Bu inşaatlar devam edecek, yeni inşaatlar başlayacak, İstanbul her zaman bir şantiye alanı olacak. Kanal projesi olmayacak belki ama teleferik projesi, bilmem ne tünelin bilmem ne bağlantısı projesi olacak. Devamlı bir yeni emlak alanları açma, yeni arsa üretme, yeni mekan üretimi projeleri olacak. Belki beş sene önce yapılan TOKİ konutları bundan beş sene sonra yıkılacak, yenileri yapılacak. Bu değişimin kendisi zaten tahayyül. Bir yere varacağı bir vizyon zaten yok. Eğer böyle giderse tabii. Ama bunun beş sana daha böyle gideceğini ben düşünmüyorum. Yani dünyadaki genel finansal tablo bize bunun böyle devam edemeyeceğini söylüyor, hem Türkiye’deki tablo bunun devam edemeyeceğini söylüyor. Onunun için zararın neresinden dönülürse kardır diye bir an önce daha fazla vermeden bu projelerin durdurulması gerekiyor. Bizim talebimiz bu. Şimdi çok bağlantılı, çok önemli bir mevzu da borçlanma mevzusu. Şimdi biz bu projeleri yapıyoruz, yeni binalar falan, bunların hepsini borçlanarak yapıyoruz. Mesela elimizde yeşil bir alan var, bir park var, bu parkı betonlaştırıyoruz ve bunu borçlanarak yapıyoruz. 

DP: Hem parktan oluyoruz, hem paramızdan.

İA: Aynen öyle. Borç altına girerek parktan oluyoruz. Yani gelecek nesillere aslında çifte kazık atıyoruz. Hem onları finansal borç yükü altında bırakıyoruz, artı yaşam alanını elinden alıyoruz, parkını elinden alıyoruz. Bu bence bir topluma yapılabilecek en büyük kötülük. Onun için bir an önce durması lazım yani, ne şekilde olursa olsun. 

Bütün bunların değişebilmesi için bizim demokrasi anlayışımızın değişmesi lazım. Türk toplumunda sadece AKP’ye oy verenlerden bahsetmiyorum, toplumun genelinden bahsediyorum. Biz demokrasiyi çoğunluğun istediği olur şeklinde okuyoruz. Bir oylama yapılır, çoğunluk ne diyorsa herkes ona uyar. 

DP: Öyle bile olmuyor da...

 İA: Evet, öyle bile olamıyor.  Meşhur çok kullanılan milli irade, “%51 bana oy verdiyse ben milli iradeyi temsil ediyorum, geri kalan %49 bu milli iradenin önünde duramaz. Yani ben onların istersem eğitim hakkını da elinden alırım, istersem konut hakkını da elinden alırım, istersem köprüyü de yaparım, mahalleyi de yıkarım, ormanı da keserim. Çünkü ben milli iradeyi temsil ediyorum.” Herkes bunu bir şekilde kabullenmiş durumda Türkiye’de, bu milli irade meselesi ve onun sözde altındaki o demokrasi tanımı. Bu aslında ortaçağ demokrasisi. Çağdaş demokrasi insan hakları üzerinden kendini kurgulayan, onun üzerinden inşaa edilen bir demokrasi anlayışı, o hakları korumak üzere. 1945’te 2. Dünya savaşı bittikten sonra Birleşmiş Milletler kuruluyor ve Evrensel İnsan Hakları Beyannamesi diye bir şey yazılıyor. Ne kadar ütopik de olsa, yani hiç bir ülke şu an o evrensel haklara saygı göstermese de, sonuçta böyle bir vizyon var ve insanlığın geldiği çağdaşlık aşaması anlamında bizim kıstas almamız gereken bir nokta. Ve çağdaş demokrasi de bunun üzerine kurulan, çoğulcu değil azınlığın haklarını korumak üzerine inşaa edilen bir demokrasi. Yani diyelim %99 benim evimi yıkmak istiyor, ama eğer o ev benim barınma hakkımı, yani insan hakkımı temsil ediyorsa o zaman gerçek  bir demokraside, çağdaş bir demokraside o evin yıkılamaması gerekiyor. Ama çoğunlukçu bir demokraside %51 bile istese o evi yıkabilirsin. Biraz bu anlayışımızı değiştirmemiz gerekiyor. Onun için bu kent mücadelesi bu kadar önemli. Bu çağdaş demokrasiyi ancak biz bu haklarımız için mücadele ederek kurabiliriz. Onun için bu hak mücadelesi çok önemli ve merkezi bir rol oynuyor aslında. Kent hakkı da tabii bunun ayrılmaz bir parçası, eğitim hakkı gibi, sağlık hakkı gibi yani diğer bütün insan haklarımız gibi. Onun için bu hak mücadelesi üzerinden verilen kavganın sadece kent hakkı mücadelesi olmadığını, aslında, özünde bir demokrasi mücadelesi olduğunu görmek lazım ve örgütlü bir şekilde bu mücadeleyi büyütmek lazım.

 Interview Transcript

Translated by Nicholas Glastonbury

Duygu Parmaksızoğlu (DP): İmre, can you please talk about yourself a little bit? What did you do until you began working on the film?

İmre Azem (İA): I graduated in 1998 from Tulane University in New Orleans. After graduating, I moved to New York. I worked in magazine publishing for awhile. I started making films in 2002-2003. I wasn’t really making films at the time, actually, I was working as a cameraman on other people’s projects. I learned editing, how to use a camera; I did those kinds of jobs. Then I worked for awhile in carpentry. After I gained enough experience and saved up some money from the carpentry job, I decided it was time for me to do my own project and I returned to Istanbul in 2007 to make Ecumenopolis. 

 DP: Can you talk about the process that led up to the filming of the documentary Ecumenopolis? When did you begin thinking about this project? Or are there specific events that sparked this project? Why the transformation of Istanbul? Why did you think of something like this for your first project?

İA: Well, I always had the idea to make a film about the city. At first, as I went back and forth to and from Istanbul, I kept wondering why planning this city seems so impossible. My first investigations were all about this question of planning. When I returned to Istanbul and got more into the work, when I did more research, the third bridge was a prominent topic, for example, and the same was true for urban transformation. But instead of making a documentary that looked in-depth into any of these issues, I wanted to make something that showed the connections among them, something that showed the big picture. Because that’s what actually interested me. How are these things related to one another? So with urban transformation, with the third bridge, with transportation, with the housing issue, once I really got into it, those connections became much clearer. and the topic of Ecumenopolis wasn’t something I knew about, wasn’t something I’d been educated on. In other words, it wasn’t the kind of process in which there was something I saw, knew, and wanted to explain. I also had a learning curve, and we might call this a project to honestly communicate the things that I learned.

DP: So why the name “Ecumenopolis”?

İA: While I was doing research, I encountered “Ecumenopolis” in an article I read. Ahmet Vefik Alp was the first to use it for Istanbul.

DP: He’s a city planner, right?

İA: Yes, he’s an architect, a city planner. He was the first to use Ecumenopolis for Istanbul. I did some research about what an Ecumenopolis was and just how well suited it was to Istanbul. I ended up making that the name of the film long before I finished it, when I was still in the research phase.

DP: And it suits the film well. When it comes to urban transformation in Turkey, there’s a dominant perception, people have specific ways of thinking about it. This perception, on the one hand, is rooted in earthquake protection, urban beautification, and foundation reinforcement, but on the other hand, it’s constituted by economic growth, etc. Ecumenopolis occupies a place that dispels and interrogates this perception. How effective do you think this film was in impacting the dominant perception? Whom was it able to reach? Did you have a target audience as you were preparing the film? Were you able to reach that audience? How successfully do you think the messages and the concerns in the film were conveyed? 

İA: University students were our target audience as we were making the film. But I can say that at this point it has reached a much broader audience than we ever imagined. We weren’t expecting it to be so big. I had anticipated that the film would spread by word of mouth, because it’s a film that provokes debate. Or rather, it’s a film that creates the foundation for debate on a topic that implicates everyone, about which everyone has a lot to say, particularly given the statistics it contains. There are debates to be had about them. In that regard, I see it is an important contribution. For example, in the interviews we do, the interviews we do after screenings of the film, as I said, everyone is very charged on the subject; everyone would keep talking until morning if you let them. The film provides a frame, a support system for that debate. In that sense, I find it to be very valuable. Has it reached enough people? In other words, has it reached a place where it will change things? I have no idea. I don’t know how I would measure that. In the end, this is really just a spark. There could be a number of factors that might transform this into a fire, or it could start smaller fires everywhere, I don’t know. But the returns we’ve gotten have been very positive. It became a film that everyone feels has added something to their lives. Apart from that, what was the total impact of the film… ultimately, I’m not sure we made a film to change anything, if we could change anything, maybe in conjunction with other things. We’ve certainly had an impact in conjunction with other elements of the struggle.

DP: The framework and support system you discussed is really quite accurate. It became easier to talk about these topics, to understand them, and to explain them after the film. I think we all needed that broad perspective—in terms of understanding the process we’re going through, of situating it in a place. Based on your observations, I’d say that there’s been a change in how people who have seen the documentary approach the issue of urban transformation. We see many people beginning to balk at how far this process has gone.

 İA: The Guardian published an article on “The Roots of Gezi,” for example. It talked about how Ecumenopolis awakened people to the state of the city before Gezi, how the dynamics of Gezi should be traced back to the film, things that made us quite happy.

 DP: The process of urban transformation might be the biggest obstacle preventing us from perceiving the city as a whole. The process tears the city apart, splitting it into pieces and turning each of these pieces into potential vehicles for profit, turning them into commodities. In every street, every building, every neighborhood it comes upon, it creates “investments” instead of living spaces. Perhaps everyone in Istanbul right now is “living within an investment,” as Ayşe Çavdar put it. A general imaginary about ecology and the city where we live can’t develop. The only way out of the chaos in which we live might be to generate this broader imaginary. To generate a vision a broader perspective about the city or about ecology. How do you think this broader imaginary can come into being?

İA: I think it’s something that, in the most general sense, could be possible through democratization. How? If there were some kind of mechanism by which we, the people who live in the city, had more of a say, of course when you have a say over something, it brings out the consciousness of having ownership, of being part of the city, it’s kind of like that. For example, when someone who lives in Gaziosmanpaşa defends a park that is under development in, let’s say, Sarıyer, those are really great things. Things we see in various examples here and there. But quite frankly, they’re not things we can expect from everyone. But I think that if people could at least have a say regarding their own living spaces, that urban consciousness would slowly develop. It’s not something that’ll happen immediately. And it’s not something that will happen through something we can do. But I think it’s a process that has to do with those democratic mechanisms, mechanisms that shape the city. It’s not possible to give people that consciousness by showing them a movie or making them read a book. I think they can feel it more fully by experiencing it, by becoming a part of that process. It’s necessary to say, too, that it isn’t a particularly natural thing for 15-20 million people to live all together in the first place. The scope of the city is contrary to human nature. For that reason, to have a few people feel like city-dwellers within such an unnatural environment, feel like they belong there, is connected to democratic processes. 

 DP: Yes, you’re right. It’s not natural for 15-20 million people to try to live together.

İA: It’s also not natural for the city to have grown so much either. That’s why it would be absurd to expect everyone to try and reclaim the city.

DP: As long as “The Right to the City,” or the right to shelter, education, a healthy environment, health services, and equal transportation, is not adopted by everyone, it remains an abstract concept. But as soon as everyone starts to claim that right in the same way, it begins to have some meaning. It’s difficult to expect everyone to take ownership over their living spaces in the same way and to participate in the same struggles.

İA: Who we mean when we say everyone is also important. Is everyone really everyone? We did an interview with David Harvey while he was in Istanbul, I think it was published in Express, and something he said seems relevant. “The Right to the City” is an inclusive concept, but it only becomes inclusive by leaving some things out. The concept of the right to the city has to leave something out. In fact, it’s capital. So when we say everyone, it’s not quite everyone. If the people who are left behind are going to have a say about the city, if we’re talking about a city, a right to the city, that is shaped according to their needs and desires, then we necessarily have to leave this capital out of the notion of the right to the city.

DP: So, the urban movements—for example, the Urban movements, the Istanbul Urban Defense, Our Commons, the neighborhood associations, solidarities, etc.—when we think of these altogether, how effective do you think they are in generating that imagination of the city that we talked about? How effective do you think these movements and initiatives will be in shaping the future of Istanbul?

İA: These movements, some of them have been struggling for years. Particularly the trade associations have been fighting for decades all on their own. But they weren’t doing so in a way that involved the masses. Before Gezi, various neighborhood associations, in conjunction with the slow awakening of neighborhoods threatened by urban transformation, had mobilized; but after Gezi, I think there was really a leap in the name of reclaiming these living spaces.

DP: Did reclaiming living space gain a narrative, a concreteness?

İA: It gained concreteness, and with that, Gezi created something that engaged everyone on the subject matter because it impacted everyone’s lives. Most of the movements you listed, whether it be the Northern Forest Defense or the Golden Horn Solidarity, these are all actually part of a movement that strengthened and emerged after Gezi, emerged out of the park assemblies, the neighborhood assemblies, the forums. How much of an impact did it have? I don’t think it’s possible to say that they’ve made many gains in practice, but that doesn’t mean that it hasn’t been effective. If construction in Validebağ can only continue behind a police blockade, I think that’s a significant gain. If they can only build an İmam Hatip school in the Göçmen Konutları housing development in Başakşehir, that’s a significant gain. The struggle for Emek Cinema is another good example of this. It is a struggle that started long before Gezi and it is a struggle that at this point has been lost or is close to being lost. But the struggle for Emek Cinema, which has a place within the wider struggle for the right to the city, gave it a lot of momentum. For this reason, even if there haven’t been concrete gains, I think that these struggles have given strength for the next stage, like a snowball effect. But we have to acknowledge that we are still at the very beginning of this. These struggles will transform into concrete gains eventually, but I think we need to be stubborn and persevere.

DP: One shouldn’t expect grand changes overnight. We are already aware that the dominant perceptions are eroding day by day and that they are no longer able to manage perceptions regarding urban transformation as easily as they used to. There are clear gains but we’re not where we need to be.

 İA: I certainly don’t think we aren’t making progress. There`s something that is critically important for this struggle`s success, something that has yet to be spoken of in Turkey, even as we get better at organizing, as we understand the city better, as these various organizations—the neighborhood organizations, the trade organizations—begin to work closer together, and as neighborhoods begin to organize among themselves. The urban struggle in the neighborhoods needs to build a relationship with the labor struggle, the workers` struggle, to close that gap between the two movements. This is something that David Harvey says. That is, what if we were to structurally see these neighborhoods. particularly those neighborhoods that are under threat, as belonging to the workers, as workers’ neighborhoods, and conceive of the two important places in these people’s lives: their workplaces as well as their homes. If both dimensions were to become organized and united, that’s what would bring us to the next phase in the struggle for the right to the city. There doesn’t seem to be an example of this yet in Turkey.

 DP: Perhaps there are a few scattered examples worth noting.

İA: The unions that were a part of Taksim Solidarity, such as DİSK (Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey), KESK (Confederation of Public Workers` Unions), TTB (Turkish Medical Association), joined the ranks of the urban struggles for the first time during Gezi. They had previously been absent in other struggles, they hadn’t been a part of them. As I said, one of the biggest gains from Gezi, or from Taksim Solidarity, was the fact that these labor organizations entered the struggle for the city, and it’s very important that this continues. 

DP: And it might be the beginning of the idea to think about those things together. 

İA: Well, right now within the struggle for the right to the city, we’re not just fighting against a phenomenon that has to do with the city on its own. We’re fighting against the neoliberal system. And this neoliberal system isn’t only damaging the city, the city isn’t the only area affected by it. It affects all areas of labor, it affects culture, it affects every aspect of life. What we eat, what we drink, energy, etc. So it’s important to situate the struggle for the right to the city in that framework.  The struggle against hydroelectric power plants in rural areas, the struggle against nuclear power plants, the broader struggle for democratization in Turkey, etc. We have to see all of these struggles as very closely related. That’s why it’s necessary to build relationships with other struggles. 

DP: Let’s talk about your new film a bit, if you want. You’re working on a new documentary. You were even in France recently for filming, you went to a real estate exhibition there. Why’d you go to that exhibition, what were your impressions? Can you talk about this a bit?

İA: In Ecumenopolis, we explain broadly what capital is doing in the city. This term, capital, it kept coming up, we talk about foreign capital, we talk about domestic capital. This is generally how we always talk in the struggle for the city. But who is capital, what is it, where does it come from, where is it going, we want to look at that a bit. We want to give a bit more depth to the phenomenon we call capital. We want to be able to produce some concrete definitions. We want to show first of all how this capital functions widely in finance markets across the world, and second of all we want to show its relationship with the construction and real estate industries. Just like what happened with Ecumenopolis, this isn’t a project where we said, we know something and let’s go on and explain it. There was a lot that we had to learn and understand in the first place. We are trying to educate ourselves, we are trying to gather information on the topic. We want to show the chain, the mechanism operating between the investor who makes an investment and reaps a profit in return, and Uncle Şadi whose home gets destroyed in Gaziosmanpaşa. How does it begin, from where and by what means does it come to that point? In Ecumenopolis, I think we sufficiently explained what happens, what its impact is. Now we want to make a film that takes a look at the other side of the picture and gets to the root of the issue. But of course since we don’t know this, I can’t say too much. This is just, let’s say, our perspective and our goal. We aim to show this, and hopefully we can. 

DP: We can’t wait. I think Non-Space was a segment of the second film. It was circulated quite a bit on social media, I came across it a lot, and it got really good responses.

İA: Yes, it’s a short segment that’s circulating. I look every so often, there are 200-300 viewers every day.

DP: And that interest is only going to increase. I’d like to return to the exhibition. I read your article in Diken. I keep close track of the construction industry in Turkey, where it is and what direction it’s evolving in. As you know, I work on urban transformation in Fikirtepe. There’s nearly forty firms working on that project, and most of the firms’ current and future situations are ambiguous. So, in other words, I’ve been following what will happen, where will this business go, where will these people find money to continue. Can you talk a bit about your impressions at the exhibition?

İA: Well, in the big picture, Turkey spent a lot of money at the exhibition. Investors and municipalities in Turkey—in other words, both private and public sectors—had a big presence at the exhibition. But Turkey’s been making an appearance at MIPIM for the past four to five years. Before, they were never at MIPIM, which has been the largest real estate exhibition since 1990. There are three significant Turkish actors who bear responsibility for this publicity. One of them is the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (İTO), another is the municipalities (Beyoğlu, Ankara, etc.); Balıkesir municipality set up a stand, the municipalities of Bursa and Antalya came for the first time. And then there’s the Beyoğlu Investment Group, which calls itself BIG for short, composed of 32 companies with investments in Beyoğlu. These investors, who came together under this umbrella group, are working under the leadership of Beyoğlu municipality, and by spending large amounts of money at MIPIM, they are part of a cycle among Turkey’s publicity, followed by Istanbul’s publicity, followed by Beyoğlu’s publicity. First of all, for example, they rented a very large Istanbul booth. There are four spaces for large booths at MIPIM. The Netherlands, as a country, took one of them for its cities; then, there was a booth for London, a booth for Paris, and a booth for Istanbul. They spent 3.6 million Euros for the booth alone. Inside, there was a ninety-six square meter model of Istanbul, a model so big that it would make everyone at MIPIM talk about Istanbul. The Istanbul Chamber of Commerce had the model made in China. They spent an enormous amount of money, and they sponsored the opening night party, it was an enormous party. BIG and İTO were written all over everything. And over the course of four days, there were different conferences and speakers regarding Istanbul. Discover Turkey talks and panels, stuff like that. There were special breakfasts organized for the investors. Beyoğlu Municipality organized one of them. They did a lot of PR. In all of the talks, the presentations, in the tent, the Turkish corner, basically everywhere, they’re trying to draw a rose-colored picture of Turkey. Turkey is being marketed via two primary points: Istanbul and Beyoğlu. One of these arguments emphasizes particularly that Turkey is now a consumer society. To support this, for example, the president of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce says things like there are one hundred ten thousand marriages in Turkey every year. This many marriages means this much demand for housing, but of course it doesn’t end with housing. Laundry machines, refrigerators, televisions, etc. are all things that stimulate consumption, and from this we can see the economic dimension and value of a conservatism that attaches such importance to marriage. This is one of the sites where conservatism conjoins with capital. 

 DP: Or the concept of the “family” designated by capital and the moral understanding it enforces.

 İA: Yes. That’s the first point. The notion that Turkey is a consumer society is the first thing used while selling and marketing Turkey. Secondly, Turkey’s developing economy is presented through its rate of growth, shown in a very rose-colored way. For example, we didn’t experience the crisis in 2008, we dodged it; a rose-colored image of the economy is drawn through these figures, suggesting that we have a very strong economy. Thirdly, the most easily sellable thing, which never gets old and is actually the easiest for Istanbul, is an 8500-year history. The clichés of being between Asia and Europe. When you think about it, over the course of fifteen years, no matter how much you screw up and mismanage a city that has existed for 8500 years, you can’t destroy those 8500 years within fifteen years. They’ve really tried to end that historical richness but in the end they’re still using it, selling it as a commodity. In fact, in their projects’ marketing campaigns, they unrepentantly use the things they’re destroying in order to build those same projects. That’s the third. Turkey is being marketed with these three things. When you look at the other cities in the rest of the fair, such as London, Paris, Kiev, Sao Paolo, and when you look at how they’re marketing themselves, you realize that in the conferences that don’t have to do with Istanbul, a new trend is being emphasized: regional coalitions of cities. 

 DP: What does that mean?

İA: It’s not just one city, but many cities marketing their communities. For example, through a co-coordination among several cities.

DP: Can you give an example?

İA: The Netherlands and Germany are examples. I don’t remember the names of the cities. They were groups of cities that are connected to one another and distribute responsibilities among each other. 

DP: It’s not a city separate from the hinterlands, but a group of cities, a region.

 İA: The fact that the Netherlands rented a booth as a country is an indication of this. It’s not marketing Amsterdam, it’s marketing a sum of different cities. This is supposedly the new trend.

 DP: So then is Istanbul a little behind?

IA: The time for single-centered cities like Istanbul has passed, supposedly. No longer global cities, but global regions. These are all of course things being said from an investment perspective. These things are important for investment. Secondly, there’s an attempt to create values based upon production. I mean, I don’t know how right it is to compare with Istanbul, but the smaller cities of Europe are trying to distinguish themselves not with their histories or cultures, but with the fact they have production there. That they have industry, factories, a worker class. In fact, they’re not only marketing industrial production but also agricultural production, in the sense that they are things that strengthen the city.

DP: A vision of the city composed of a different social fabric, where there are balanced class relations?

 İA: As much as this may be the strategy for marketing a city, ultimately I’m not an economist and I can’t speak definitively, but it seems as if they’re being marketed as the elements of a more sustainable urbanization. I mean, I’m trying to explain the difference we observed between how Istanbul is being marketed and how other cities are being marketed. Apart from that, as I said before, Istanbul spent all that money on marketing, but on 10 March, the day that the exhibition opened, the Financial Times newspaper— standard-bearer and mouthpiece for capitalism—published a half-page article. The article talks especially about Erdoğan`s arrogant efforts to control the judiciary, to control the media, his oppression, his financial policies, his polemical engagement with the Central Bank, his attempt to suppress economic policies, his forceful interventions into people`s lifestyles: the article paints a very arrogant portrait of Erdoğan and talks about how this is hidden from foreign investors. This half-page article was published on the day the exhibition opened in a newspaper distributed for free at the exhibition. Everyone was reading this newspaper, except probably the Turks. And in fact, everyone is aware that this political atmosphere, the risks, everything is not going well. For example, nobody attended one of these conferences that painted a rose-colored image of Turkey and then went and invested two hundred million dollars in Turkey. In particular, that segment of elite investors, the Europeans, know quite well what is going on in Turkey and for them, the political risks are much more significant than the return of an investment. They can calculate the economic risks but they can’t calculate the political risk. They don’t want to invest because they can’t calculate it. We talked to the investors at Cannes, people who invested in hotels in Turkey, people with hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of investments. Of course they don’t say anything in front of the camera. They say that everything is great and that they’ll continue to invest. But when the camera`s off, the subject matter changes, and they talk about how everyone, not just potential investors but also people who currently have investments, are all trying to get out of Turkey. This is the impression we got. In other words, all that money they spent was spent in vain.

 DP: Let me ask one last question. Let’s talk about the future a bit, about Istanbul’s future. A city is emerging from the hegemony of the Housing Development Administration (TOKİ), shopping malls, and luxury skyscrapers. The streets are constantly changing. Interactions between people are dwindling and becoming more standardized. One of the elements that makes a city a city is the diversity and frequency of interactions between people. Right now, as these interactions become less frequent, they are also becoming more homogenized. What kind of Istanbul do you foresee five or ten years from now if things continue this way? Do you have a mental image of Istanbul after the next five or ten years?

İA: If things continue like this, this vision and imagination of Istanbul is one of change, constant change. There`s no point where it will arrive or come to an end five years from now. Even if it`s a construction zone right now and it`s undergoing huge change, five years from now, there`s no way that this construction will end and there will be a brand new Istanbul. The construction will continue, new construction will begin and Istanbul will always remain a construction zone. Maybe the canal project won’t happen but the cable car connecting Tünel to who knows where will happen. There will be continuous projects to constantly open new real estate zones, create new plots, produce new spaces. Five years from now, the TOKİ housing built five years ago might be torn down and new units might be built. This constant change is itself an imaginary. There is no vision for where it will arrive. That is, if it continues as it’s going now. But I don’t think this will go on for another five years. Global financial reports tell us that it can’t go on like this, and the reports in Turkey also tell us that it can’t go on like this. These projects need to stop as soon as possible because it’s better to lose what we’ve already lost than to lose it all. This is what we’re demanding. Another closely-related and very important matter is the matter of loans. We’re doing all these projects, building new buildings, and we’re doing it all by taking out loans. For example, we have green space, a park, and we turn this park into concrete and we’re doing so by taking out loans.

 DP: We’re losing our park, and our money.

İA: Exactly. We lose our park by incurring debt. I mean, we’re ripping off the next generation in two ways. We’re leaving them under the burden of financial debt and we’re taking away their living space, taking away their parks. I think this is the worst thing you can do to a society. And it needs to stop as soon as possible, no matter how.

Our understanding of democracy needs to change in order for all these other things to be able to change. I’m not just taking about the people in Turkish society who vote for the AKP, I’m talking about broader society. We conceive of democracy in terms of the majority getting what it wants. There’s a vote and whatever the majority says is suitable for everyone.

 DP: It doesn’t even happen like that…

İA: Yes, it isn’t even able to happen like that. That famous “national will” that they always refer to. If fifty-one percent of the people voted for me then I represent the national will, the other forty-nine percent can’t stand in the way of this national will. If I want, I can take their right to education, if I want I can take their right to shelter, if I want I’ll build a bridge, I’ll tear down the neighborhood, I’ll cut down the forest. Because I represent the national will and everyone has accepted this in some way or another in Turkey, this issue of national will and the definition of democracy that lies beneath it. This is in fact a democracy of the Middle Ages. Modern democracy, an understanding of democracy that constructs itself upon human rights, is supposed to protect those rights. In 1945, after the Second World War ended, the United Nations was established and a Universal Declaration of Human Rights was written. Regardless of the fact that it was so utopic, and that no country currently respects those universal rights, ultimately there was this vision; it was a point where we needed to set benchmarks for the stage of modernity that humanity had reached. And modern democracy is a democracy founded upon these principles, a democracy constructed not to protect the rights of the majority but rather the rights of the minority. I mean, let’s say ninety-nine percent of the people want to destroy my house, but if that house represents my right to shelter, my human rights, then in a real democracy, in a modern democracy, that house should not be destroyed. But in a majoritarian democracy, you can destroy that house if fifty-one percent of the people want to destroy it. We need to change this understanding we have of democracy. That’s why the struggle for the city is so important. We can establish this modern democracy only by fighting for these rights. That’s why this struggle for rights is so important and plays such a central role. The right to the city is of course an inseparable part of this struggle, just like the right to education, the right to health, and all of our other human rights. This is why the fight we wage in this struggle is not just rooted in the struggle for the right to the city, but in fact, we should see it fundamentally as a struggle for democracy and we should try and expand this struggle in an organized way.

Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Racism, Alliances, and Misery: A STATUS/الوضع Conversation between Moe Ali Nayel and Bassam Haddad

Moe Ali Nayel, a freelance journalist, fixer, and translator based in Beirut, Lebanon, discusses the question of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and how the landscape of Lebanon receives them. In addition to his insights and observations, Moe Ali provides signs, posters, warnings, and maps from Beirut.

Please find the transcript of the interview below the player.

The interview includes three parts that you can click on separately.

Moe Ali writes for Lebanese-based and International English publications. In 2010, he decided to change his tools from fixer to writer and published his first critique. Later in 2011, Nayel began his reporting on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon for Electronic Intifada. To read more by Moe Ali Nayel, most of his work can be found on his blog. You can follow him on Twitter @MoeAliN.

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Interview Transcript
Transcribed by Samantha Brotman


Bassam Haddad (BH): Good Morning, Moe. We are very happy that you are able to join us. We are going to discuss the question of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and we would like to start with an overall view on the status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and the landscape within Lebanon that receives Syrian refugees, and how that already complex landscape in Lebanon affects the distribution of Syrian refugees across different regions in Lebanon.

Moe Ali Nayel (MA): Good morning, Bassam. Thank you for having me over on your show. It is definitely an important topic. I would like to go back just a tiny bit to the beginning, when the militant conflict in Syria started and Syrian refugees start fleeing into Lebanon. It started by Lebanon having an open border policy as a strategy, and it stopped—the Lebanese state did not have a managing policy or a strategy to deal with the influx of people that were coming into Lebanon. And so, three years later, we are with 1.3 million Syrian refugee[s] who are who are chaotically spread in Lebanon. The Lebanese government cannot make its mind to creating camps, to send them in, or have an actual strategy to manage the distribution of Syrian refugees. 

So what happened, many refugees from certain sects ended up going to the areas that are known in Lebanon to belonging to a certain sect, feeling that maybe they have families there or relatives. The vast majority of the refugees who come from impoverished areas in Syria already, so they come with a very low [economic] status, and they usually fled with nothing on them. They ended up settling in impoverished areas in Lebanon, because it suited their [economic] status. And so, that [is] mainly what has been creating a kind of resentment from the Lebanese who are already impoverished and neglected in [those] areas, feeling that now there [are] more people competing [with] them [for] their jobs, and [for] their living, also receiving aid. But it is not a realistic feeling, in a sense. Because Syrian refugees in impoverished were not competing [with] the Lebanese. They just kept doing the jobs that Syrians usually do in Lebanon, which [are] menial jobs. This time they were being taken advantage of by Lebanese business men, and hired for very low day-pay, which also increased the economic problem in the region. If you look, for instance, into Mount Lebanon-the region of `Aley particularly, the wife of Walid Jumblat [has] set up a committee and a managing body to deal with Druze refugees who are coming from Syria and settle them inside houses and look after them. This is something that was unprecedented in all of Lebanon. Only in some Christian areas that the Catholic church and the Maronite church looked after some Christian refugees that were coming from Syria with low economical situations. The rest of the refugees were spread out across the country chaotically, and so today what we see is that there is two kinds resentments against the refugees: there is the socio-economic resentment by the poor who are realizing that we have not been getting anything from the state or anyone, but the Syrian refugees are getting some sort of aid. And now some aid agencies are aiding Lebanese families and Syrian families at the time in poor areas. And there is the other fold, which is the middle-class Syrians, the professional Syrians, who could do technical jobs, were taken in by Lebanese bosses on the account of the Lebanese employees who were fired because this Syrian labor was cheaper and the Lebanese would hire two Syrians instead of one Lebanese. That also created an extra resentment amongst the Lebanese who occupied these jobs. 

And then, at the moment, it got all mixed up, because there is the-obviously-the fights that are going on on the border, and the Lebanese army is being involved, and there [are] some soldiers kidnapped. And, at the moment, the attacks against Syrian refugees are not necessarily sectarian, but rather because of the dysfunctional situation of the Lebanese state. Because the Lebanese now are feeling burned. They are just choosing their boogeyman of choice, which is the Syrian refugees. 

BH: This is something that recalls another era, where another group was also considered the boogeyman, irrespective of the fact that there were some serious differences. Of course, I am talking about the question of...

MA: [Ali Interrupts] The Palestinians.

BH: Palestinians in Lebanon.

MA: Of course.

BH: And perhaps this is a bit different, because they were actually quite equipped and quite armed, and so on and so forth, and organized as such. Before we go on, can you tell us a little bit about your own background and how you are able to conduct your research in Lebanon within this context? And what is it that you are actually doing in terms of your own objectives as a journalist?

MA: I started out eight years ago as a fixer, working with international journalists. Because I wanted to learn journalism, and when I went to the Lebanese university, the guy simply told me, "Go get the wasta in order to study journalism." So I decided to teach myself and I started working for the journalists as a fixer and translator. And through that, I started discovering stories and areas in Lebanon that I had not personally discovered. That was a shock to me, especially discovering Palestinian camps, discovering the reality-the hidden reality from the Lebanese society as a whole-and that opened my eyes on the situation in Lebanon, how it is on the ground, and how it is reported in Western media and in foreign media. My experience as well, and my urge, comes from my experience in the United States. I lived there for a few years, and that was after September eleventh. I kind of felt some sort of misleading conduct of my identity, of where I come from, among many Americans—whether at college or outside of college. There was a lot of misrepresentation. And there is a lot of wrong portrayal of where I come from. And so, when I came back to Lebanon, not liking the American dream that I went for, I realized I would like to contribute to the international scene about stories and narratives that are happening directly, from my own eyes, and not from the eyes of foreign journalists who usually end up reducing the whole narrative to his or her own personal motivations. So, since eight years ago, I got into this business. Forty years ago, I started writing after I gained confidence, and I felt like I am [at] a good point where I can start advocating my own stories. And so, I tried to stay as a freelancer because I like to focus on the things that do not take much attention. I like to dig deep into stories and look beyond the obvious. And because I speak the language, I understand the culture and I am not strictly tied to one bubble-whether a secular bubble or a sectarian bubble-in Lebanon, I have this access. I have this access with the people, and I am not there to fool anyone. I am there to try to deliver to their voice, to try to deliver the message as clear as possible. And so, my passion comes from the love of writing and the love of advocating. 

BH: I wanted to ask you about the situation in ‘Irsal in Lebanon and the conflict there between militant groups on the one hand and the Lebanese army and Hizballah on the other. Are we looking at a microcosm of what might come later? Is this something that you have looked into? 

MA: Of course, I have been saying [this] for the last two years, since I started going to ‘Irsal more often than the past. I discovered ‘Irsal in 2007-2008, during the Fath al-Islam war, and I found ties from ‘Irsal to Nahr al-Bared, but that is something else. And the last two years, it has been becoming obvious that ‘Irsal will be the entrance into a bigger conflict towards Lebanon. The reason is ‘Irsal is a neglected, marginalized town in Lebanon. The economy there is very much dependent on the work of stone breaking from the mountains surrounding [it], and so that is the main economy of the town. People in ‘Irsal have made money because of that. The ones who left ‘Irsal either went to Beirut, took professional jobs, or left Lebanon. But the majority of the people in ‘Irsal live on the mountain that they crush and the agriculture that they used to import to Syria, actually, and they could not in the past two years. There has been a massive influx of refugees toward ‘Irsal and there has been very little attention or intervention from the Lebanese government. Also, ‘Irsal being a Sunni area in this sea of Shi`a tribes and Shi`a villages has created some sort of resentment because of the division with and against the Syrian regime from the beginning. And so, recently, the whole thing has been deteriorated following the kidnap[ping] of the Lebanese soldiers in ‘Irsal, and following the resentment from the surrounding villages accusing people in ‘Irsal of being collaborators with the Islamic militant groups. 

The thing is that, in ‘Irsal, also people there have been deceived by the leadership, by the political leadership, which was embodied by the Future Party to a certain extent. In the last three years they have lost faith in Saad al-Hariri and the Future Party and they have [taken] the Syrian Revolution as their own cause for many reasons. For economic reasons-whether smuggling, which flourished a lot in the last three years-or whether brotherly ties with their Sunni brothers across the border. Because ‘Irsal also historically has suffered from the Syrian regime. Hafiz al-Asad bombed ‘Irsal a few times in the 1980s. And during the Syrian military occupation, ‘Irsal actually suffered especially more than the rest of the towns around it. 

Today, there is three-times the amount of refugees in ‘Irsal. And following the war in Qalamun, a lot of warriors have sent their families into ‘Irsal itself. I published an article with Jadaliyya earlier this year. While I was investigating the story, I was in ‘Irsal, and I was approached by a few bearded men in a Syrian refugee camp, [who] took me aside and said, "Look, man. We want to go fight in Syria but we cannot fight, we have to come back and protect our women. Because we are coming back and finding them pregnant." So, there was this sort of resentment between the Syrian refugees as a whole and the people of ‘Irsal as well. It all got complicated when the Lebanese army entered the town and sort of besieged it, as people from ‘Irsal like to call it. The people from ‘Irsal saw the Lebanese army as an enemy fighting them. It did not see the Lebanese army as a liberator, because of the conduct the Lebanese army did. Also, the people there believe that the army is a tool in the hands of Hizballah, that is their own vision about the Lebanese army. There is this common thing that you see in ‘Irsal, you see in a lot of interior areas, in the mountainside, and in the villages of Lebanon, that the army is not there to protect them, but there to actually keep them under control, there to enforce the law on them, in times where the Lebanese government does not really exist. So what we are seeing at the moment is really crucial. There has been some kidnap[ping]s in the last few days from people from ‘Irsal following the killing of the third soldier, [Muhammad] Hamiyyah. And there has been direct accusations towards ‘Irsal as a village, who is calling it responsible for the blood of the soldiers that are being kidnapped. This could hold only for so much, because ‘Irsal has been highly militarized. At the moment, by infiltration from fighters group, like Abu-Hassan al-Filistini, who is actually a Lebanese guy who went forth in Syria and then came back to the region of Qalamun, opened up his own shop, and gave allegiances to ISIS and then finally, he recruited another man from ‘Irsal. Because he was actually involved in [the] smuggling business and racketeering. He was providing power and a sort of economy, a sort of income to a lot of jobless men in ‘Irsal that used to work in the mounting, breaking stone and selling it. That business right now has stopped. And so, adding to the resentment that ‘Irsal has already with Hizballah, with the Lebanese army, the people in ‘Irsal are kind of in a situation where they feel they are confronted by everyone at this point, which can only lead to an unprecedented explosion in that region between ‘Irsal and its surrounding [areas].

BH: Can you tell us a little bit about ‘Irsal in terms of its demographic conditions, its location, just a brief note about what ‘Irsal is for those who not quite aware of this area. 

MA: If you go into Beq‘a and you pass Baalbek, you go through a al-Labwe area, and then you suddenly make a right and go up the mountain, and then go down the mountain and you are in a town that is completely isolated from its surrounding[s]. It is actually closer to Syria than it is to Lebanon, demographically and geographically. The people in ‘Irsal have, historically, [gone] to Syria for education, for medical care, and for shopping in many cases. They have less relations with Beirut or Lebanon, as much [as] they have relations with Syria. And so, today ‘Irsal is being asked to show its patriotism and nationalism as a Lebanese town, while, in reality, the town does not really feel so Lebanese, as much as it feels that it is closer to a Syrian region. If you look at it on the map, it even looks a bit separated from the Lebanese. It is like it is an extension towards Syria. It is an area of 35,000 residents. And it has, at the moment, over 100,000 Syrian refugees. 

BH: Let us move to another sensitive topic. And it relates to the feelings and attitudes of the many in Lebanon towards Syrian refugees. And there has been an escalation in violence, an escalation in tension, and many attribute that to racism or classism, and we are likely to see more of this chauvinistic kind of attitude at the level of the public and at the level of the state as well. Can you tell us a little bit about the situation? And what might actually happen the more refugees are received into Lebanon and the more the tension grows? What are the risks there, that we have not seen yet?

MA: Well, for starters, what is happening at the moment in Lebanon is a very classic, Lebanese thing that we have seen many times in the past, actually. It is ironic that, after three years of the Syrian conflict and Syrian refugees in Lebanon, that the whole thing went into different scenarios. At the moment, while Lebanon does not have water-hotels in Hamra, for instance, are filling up their tanks from the sea. In Hamra it is all salt water, any restaurant you go to, you wash, it is salt water-there is no electricity, there is very [scarce] electricity. Power cuts in Beirut [are] up to fourteen hours a day sometimes. And so, the security situation is deteriorating, everybody is buying guns, there is no security on the street. And all of this has been packaged by Lebanese politicians as the result of the Syrian refugees. Of course, Lebanon has been like that. And this year, I would like to touch on one point that we see a lot in the media, that the Syrian conflict is spilling into Lebanon. I am a bit against that analogy. I think Lebanon has spilled into Syria from the beginning. Because Lebanon [has] been dysfunctional, been divided on sectarian lines, been a country without a state for the last thirty-five years, at least. So, today, all of this is being dumped on the Syrian refugees. The socioeconomic situation in the country is ridiculous as well. It is very bad at the moment, with a high price of living. And so today, what we see on the streets are two-folds: There is the agitation against the Syrians that is driven by the work and the speeches of politicians and their media departments; Also, there is the fact that now there [are] Lebanese soldiers who are kidnapped by groups who came from Syria originally, who originated in Syria. And suddenly it created this Lebanese ultra-nationalism, all of the sudden, against the Syrians. Even amongst communities who were extremely supportive of the Syrian refugees and the Syrian revolution, right now they are turning against them. What we see today is calls, for example, in Sin al-Fil, saying, "Let us remove Suq al-Ahad because it is a scene that is collecting a lot of Syrians, a lot of unwanted habitats.” So, there [are] attacks on this kind of lifestyle. There are thuggish attacks every night on, for instance, delivery workers who happen to be Syrians. So, you have this outburst of chaos right now that is completely directed at Syrians. And it is not being countered by the Lebanese state or by any political narrative that tells otherwise. So, it is very dangerous, because the kind of-I would say-not racist, but rather classist, chauvinistic Lebanese expressions, violent expressions, against impoverished Syrians at the moment is dangerous because it is happening from the level of the state and the level of the citizens. 

The Syrians can only take so much until they become radicalized for revenge, basically, for purposes of revenge. And when they become radicalized, some other impoverished, poor Sunnis, who have been showing resentment in the last two years, today feel that they are completely impatient. This could be [an] emerging force. This could be something that the mindless-like you said in the beginning, as the Palestinians, as Fatah was used in the past by the Sunnis to fight the Maronite-today, the Syrians could be, their resentments, could be galvanized by opportunists, in order to use them as foot soldiers. But I think we are at a point where something serious has to happen to prevent that. Otherwise, what we could see in Lebanon is the continuation of the long fifteen-year civil war that right now is taking shape on the streets. You have to think that in Beirut, for instance, the neighborhood leader is coming back again, and is coming back with vengeance, and is recruiting unemployed men, Syrian and Lebanese. So that can only lead toward a massive explosion at a time where Lebanon is not in good shape to hold its state together, or to hold its communities together. There [are] neighborhood watches everywhere outside the Beirut that are precisely targeting Syrians. And neighborhood watches [are] completely done by citizens. 

So, today Lebanon is not in a situation where it could reverse the situation to three years ago. I am worried because what I saw recently on the streets in Beirut was something really, really dangerous. For instance, lining up Syrians on the streets, beating up Syrians, all these things are making Syrians now stay at home. Poor and middle-upper-class Syrians as well, who have been investing their money in the Lebanese economy, they have deposited their monies in Lebanese banks, they have been filling up the hotels that usually the tourists do. Those are feeling threatened in the country, and they are feeling that, “Any country actually would wish that we go take our investment and money and put them there.” So, there is that fold as well.

In the end, it is the law of the street. In the end it is the resentments of the families of the kidnapped soldiers, they are kidnapping Syrians. And so, all that combined together is a very negative equation that can only lead into further chaos, and further targeting of Syrians. 

BH: Wow, this is of course intense and unfortunate and I also see vestiges of an old time repeating again. 

MA: You know what is funny, Bassam, is that on local channels right now, even those who [are] considered liberal, the casual racist joke has been so acceptable that it becomes normalized. For instance, there was a show on Al Jadid TV that the anchor went to the street and he was speaking to Lebanese saying, "How do you feel about the Syrians? Are they bothering us?" It is a satirical show, by the way. And people were expressing their resentments in the most unflattering ways. And he picked up on a Syrian woman and asked her, "How is Lebanon?" She said, "Look the Lebanese have not been nice to us. We have not done anything wrong to them. We took them inside our houses." And the guy bursted on her. He said, "I cannot believe you are saying that. We are hosting you. Shame on you. We opened our houses, where do you think you are? This is Lebanon, this is not Syria." And, the thing is supposed to be funny. It was not funny at all, actually. It was really depressing. The public narrative right now towards the Syrians, it is actually galvanizing a lot of people towards viewing, now, the Syrian as the ultimate person who came and took everything we had, knowing that we had nothing in the past. 

I would like to add one small incident that is funny. I have a friend of mine who comes from an upper-class family. He really never worked, he goes hunting, he lives from his family`s money. I was speaking to him recently. I said, "Ahmed, how are you doing? What is going on?" He said, "Ya Zalameh there is no jobs. The Syrians took all the jobs. I cannot find a job." He made me laugh. I said, "Ahmed, you never worked even before the Syrians came to Lebanon. How dare you blame your inequities right now on the Syrians. How come you can do that?" And he basically was speechless, because that is the reality. But it is becoming a trend right now. If you fight with your wife, blame the Syrians. Your tummy aches, blame the Syrians. 

BH: Not just to play devil`s advocate, but also to look at the sheer numbers, given the sheer number of Syrians in Lebanon and given the fact that Lebanon and the Lebanese state has been unable to provide to its public, and of course always unevenly so. Even under other conditions, where a public is not ready or prone to any this kind of bias-you will be hard-pressed to find a public to find a public that is like that-but isn`t this influx a very serious development that will actually produce its own tensions, almost legitimately? If you could, tell us a little bit about the demographics, and-I know you mentioned it in the beginning-but the number of Syrian refugees and Syrians, because they are not all "refugees." 

MA: Of course. To start with the number of refugees, according to the UNHCR [(United Nations High Commission on Refugees)], there [are] 1.3 million refugees. The number, as a whole, with Syrians is 1.5-1.6, estimates vary. But, you know, you are completely right to think that, yes, it is a huge burden, let us say, on such a dysfunctional state, to actually deal with. But there is something that we are completely overlooking as well, which is the good things, in a sense, that the Syrian refugees brought into Lebanon that is not being recognized. Do not forget that under the Syrian refugees, there has been billions of dollars being spent in Lebanon, hundreds and hundreds of Lebanese are now working in international NGOs, various professions, from security guards all the way up to general managers. On top of all that, small-time Lebanese mini-markets and businesses have been contracted by the UNHCR and, in some cases, there are shops who are today selling up to $30 thousand per month, just out of the contracts the UNHCR has provided them. And so there is a lot of currency and a lot of employment that the Syrian refugees provided, knowing that the Syrian refugees get a small portion of all this portion that comes under their name. Also, there is a huge influx of labor that has been filling all the construction sites that are taking over Lebanon at the moment. Three years ago, four years ago, Syrian labor day-pay was twenty to twenty-five thousand. That is between thirteen and seventeen dollars. Today, it is five thousand to ten thousand. That is three to seven dollars per day for a construction worker. So, you see how this Syrian refugees issue has also benefitted Lebanon on many aspects. The problem is that there, now it is more visible. There has not been a strategy, like I said in the beginning, to manage the Syrian refugees, to create camps, to actually take care of them, by the Lebanese state. 

It reminds me, [as a] matter of fact, of Lebanon during the time of the Syrian military hegemony over the country, where there was an estimate back then, if I am not wrong, of 1.2 million Syrians in Lebanon, as a whole. And the Lebanese population was lesser than now, I believe. And back then you would hardly hear any complaint. Yes, the Syrian mukhabarat were extremely oppressive, so nobody dared to complain about Syrians in the country. But it was not perceived on the social level as it is perceived at the moment. And so, I believe-because Lebanon as well is a natural extension to Syria-it was completely foreseeable that Lebanon was going to go toward such [an] influx of refugees. It was completely foreseeable that Lebanon needs a strategy to deal with that. And today three years ago, none of this happened. The problem is becoming out of hand. And, you know, I was thinking the other day, at night, because [of] the many raids that have been happening on the streets, whether by security or by people, the number of Syrian women who sit on the street with their children, or Syrian beggars, or just Syrian families who walk on the corniche, have completely decreased. And I was thinking, "What if we wake up one day and all the Syrians have [gone] away, have disappeared, went back to Syria, whatever." How would we perceive that as Lebanese? I am sure we would miss them, because, I am sure trash will pile the streets, I am sure construction sites will stop working, I am sure all the menial jobs that we do not do in Lebanon-we travel, do [these jobs] in Europe and America-that the Syrians do in Lebanon. We will have to do it ourselves. If that day comes, I think, probably, as Lebanese will probably appreciate the Syrian generosity in that regard. And then, to add to it, some Syrian friends in Lebanon right now have been so demoralized by the actions against them that I know noticed from three years ago until now, they had some sort of good-heartedness that today is being completely eradicated. It has completely been a feeling of defensiveness, a feeling of hatred-I would say-towards the way Lebanon is treating. They always say, "In 2006, we took you inside our houses. How come you do this to us?" And so, it is crucial at the moment that the demographics between and Lebanon and Syria, and the way things will develop in the future. What I can see happening is, what is happening at the moment, and sectarian areas, the Syrian refugees from the sect of the area, are being silent and they are not being attacked as long as they stick to the curfew. The others, who are not from the same sect of the area, are either being taxed up to one-hundred dollars per month in order to stay, or are being pushed away. But Lebanon is too small, so [it will] just be interesting how this will go into the second phase. 

BH: Before I let you go, I just wanted to say something about the Lebanese benefitting. I mean, surely, there has been a tremendous benefit, and has been for years and perhaps decades, from the influx and the presence of Syrian workers. But, especially in the past few years, isn`t this benefit disproportionately going to shop-keepers and the middle classes, the educated, who could work with NGOs and so on and so forth? And the majority of the Lebanese, demographically, are outside these classes or these groups of people. So, does this not affect the average Lebanese who does not have this kind of access? This is, again, certainly not to justify anything that is going on, but it is a real source of pressure for this demographic. 

MA: Of course it does. 

BH: Or is it not? 

MA: No, no, of course it is, actually. To prove your point, I was in Tripoli the other day and I precisely went with a few NGO workers who have a project right now in the area of Bab al-Tibani, where they aid one Lebanese family as, [at] the same, they aid one Syrian family. It is these kind of communities who have been originally affected by the [neglect] of the Lebanese government. Before this year, the refugees arrived, the increase of population in these impoverished areas obviously created more pressure on the Lebanese who live in these areas. Because, with the Syrians coming in. Keep in mind that prices went up. Rent prices went up. So, you used to rent an apartment in Bab al-Tibani for one-hundred-fifty dollars, a two-bedroom apartment for one-hundred-fifty dollars three years ago. Today it is up to three-hundred and four-hundred dollars because there are new Syrian refugees who came. But again and again, you know, it is not necessarily to blame the Syrians, to put the blame all on the Syrian refugees. It is the responsibility of the Lebanese state. It is the responsibility of the Lebanese state neglecting those impoverished areas. It is the economic policies, it is the rich getting richer, it is the poor being abused and abused over and over again. And today, the Syrians can embody that figure that, "You are taking what was mine, or you are sharing what I used to have with my family," sort of thing. Yes, these communities are mostly affected brutally, and these communities should be taken care of as soon as possible by the Lebanese state because they are at a point where life has become so difficult because of the influx of prices brought by the Syrian refugees, brought by the Lebanese because of the increase of demand from the Syrian refugees. Today, these communities tell you that, "First of all, we do not want the Syrians. Second of all, we want to rule ourselves. We want to run our neighborhoods. We want to run our business. We do not want the Lebanese state anymore. We do not want the Lebanese politicians anymore. We want anybody strong to protect us, and we can give allegiances.” And that is dangerous. 

BH: Thank you very much, Moe. This has been quite enlightening. I hope to speak with you again. 

MA: Thank you very much. I am honored to be on your show. Thank you for having me, and I hope I will be back with you once again in the future.